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DIYERSITY AND FELICITY:
Hobbes’s Science of Human Flourishing
Ericka Tucker
We do not generally take the Hobbesian project to be one that encourages 
human flourishing. I will argue that it is؛ indeed, I will propose that Hobbes 
attempts the first modern project to provide for the possibility of the diversity 
of human flourishing in the civil state. To do so, I will draw on the recent work 
ofDonald Rutherford, who takes Hobbes tobe aeudaimonist in the Aristotelian 
tradition. In "The End of Ends?: Aristotelian themes in Early Modern Ethics" 
Donald Rutherford proposes that the recent fashion for categorizing the ethi- 
cal writings of early modern philosophers as "Epicurean” or "Stoic,” obscures 
the early moderns’ debt to Aristotle. Despite early modern philosophers’ vocal 
rejections of Aristotle, his ethics pervades theirs. Rutherford argues that even 
one of the most strenuous objectors to Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, is best 
understood as an ethical eudaimonist. According to Rutherford, to embrace 
of eudaimonism requires includes accepting two principles:
1. That the idea of happiness as human end (as the end of action)
2. That one achieves the former (1) through rational deliberation
Rutherford argues that Hobbes accepts (1) and requires (2). Tellingly,
Rutherford does not require something like (3) that there must be one ‘Good’ 
that all seek, generally thought to be the defining characteristic of eudai- 
monism. Rutherford argues that early modern ethics, particularly that of 
Hobbes and Spinoza, could not ignore the diversity of human ends. Rather, 
beginning with a diversity of human ends is what characterizes Hobbesian 
ethics. Flourishing, Hobbes recognizes, can take many forms, and this forms 
the basis of his argument for a strong, but limited state. These philosophers 
transform the notion of eudaimonism؛ yet, Rutherford argues, they do so still 
firmly within the Aristotelian eudaimonist tradition in accepting (1) and (2).
Rutherford makes an excellent start at defending Hobbes as a theorist of 
felicity and diversity؛ however, his proposal that, for Hobbes, one achieves 
felicity through reason mischaracterizes Hobbes’s moral psychology. I will 
reject one of Rutherford’s proposals, namely that Hobbes requires the notion 
of practical reason or rational deliberation to yield individual and collective
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flourishing. Rutherford argues that Hobbes requires a notion of practical 
reason so that he can explain how individuals are able to seek happiness more 
successfully than they would be by passion alone. However, this notion of 
practical reason is misapplied to Hobbes. Hobbesian biology and psychology, 
I will argue, are the principal partners in any program of individual or col- 
lective happiness. Reason can do some work, but it is not required to achieve 
happiness, nor does Hobbes give US an account of practical reason as such.
Hobbes does not think reason motivates morality. Instead, he offers an 
account of human moral and political motivation based on Aristotelian notions 
of voluntary motion. Appetites - not reason - motivate human action. As such, 
for Hobbes, effective ‘felicity) or happiness must be achieved through the 
manipulation of the affects and appetites. For Hobbes, morality is a political 
project, ^e state, for Hobbes, is a prerequisite to any individual notion of flour- 
ishing. Whether one seeks trade, learning, or pleasure, a civil state is required.
To create a peaceful state - the prerequisite for individual flourishing - one 
must coordinate the appetites and actions of a multitude of diverse individuals. 
Doing so requires understanding what reliably motivates them. To do so one 
needs not reason but knowledge of cause and effect - something quite different 
than reason in Hobbes’s view I will argue that neither individuals nor the 
sovereign use or require practical reason to yield individual or collective felic- 
ity and thus reject Rutherfords proposal (2, above) that practical reason is 
required for achieving felicity or flourishing in Hobbes’s moral philosophy..
Rejecting (2), however, does not necessarily sink Rutherford’s overall the- 
sis that Hobbes is a eudaimonist. In the second part of this paper, I will show 
that by tying Hobbes’s argumentation in favor of felicity to his additional 
arguments from flourishing in his justification of the civil state we can amass 
further evidence for (1), that Hobbes’ program is essentially one that seeks 
human felicity while recognizing the plurality of the good.
Part 1؛ Hobbes on Felicity and Reason
Although it fits well into our contemporary understanding of ethics and 
politics, the idea that each individual seeks his or her own good, and that there 
may not be one single good which all ought to seek, challenges the Aristotelian 
account of eudaimonia as understood in the seventeenth century and today. 
Hobbes’ rejection of the summum bonum of Aristotle, and his proposal that 
each individual seeks his or her own ‘felicity’ has been taken by most ethical 
theorists and Hobbes scholars to be a rejection of Aristotle’s eudaimonism and 
indeed the basis of his ethical egoism.!
1. John Deigh, “Reason and Ethics in Hobbes’s Leviathan," Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 34 (1996), pp. 33-60; Edwin Curley, "Reflections of Hobbes: Recent Work on His
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Donald Rutherford’s proposal that Hobbes is a variety of eudaimonist 
challenges these interpretations. Rutherford does so by arguing that although 
Hobbes recognized the plurality of ‘goods’ sought by individuals, he still 
sought human felicity as the highest human good. However, recognizing the 
diversity of human conceptions of felicity, Hobbes sought to create an ethical- 
political solution - the civil state - which would allow for the diversity of 
human felicity while mediating the problems that might occur with such 
diversity. That each individual might seek his or her wellbeing reliably, was, 
for Hobbes, and before him Grotius, an ethico-psychological posit to fend off 
skeptical proposals that, for humans, there could be no such universal ethics 
for fallen human beings.2 Hobbes understands the diversity of human ends as 
a fact that any ethical or political theory must take seriously. Rutherford’s 
proposal that Hobbes is a eudaimonist recognizes Hobbes not as making a 
skeptical claim - that because of diversity we cannot have any ethical or 
political system applied to humans - but rather, transforming eudaimonism 
into a theory which can retain the end of human happiness, while recognizing 
that this happiness might take radically different forms for each individual 
human. Rutherford’s interpretation of Hobbes as a eudaemonist comes within 
his larger argument that the importance of Aristotle for early modern ethics 
has been largely ignored at great detriment to our understanding of the moral 
and political philosophy of seventeenth century ethics.
Rutherford argues Hobbes was just one of the early modern philosophers 
by whom, “1 framework of Aristotle’s eudaimonism is adapted and recon- 
hgured٠”3 This reconfiguration allowed for diversity, but also for a new under- 
standing of happiness as ‘psychological’.* Happiness becomes, for early 
modern philosophers like Hobbes, “just that affective state (one of pleasure, 
contentment or satisfaction) that human beings most desire to be in and whose 
attainment they can deliberate about in deciding to act.”5 Hobbes rejects the 
notion of the highest good, and instead argues that individuals seek what they 
believe to be good for them, and avoid what they believe to be harmful. 
Hobbes’ psychological conception of felicity, Rutherford argues, while it rejects 
the central tenet of the summum bonum and the teleological conception of the 
good in eudaimonism,^ “preserves the psychology within which Aristotle’s
Moral and Political Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophical Research, 15 (1990), pp. 169-250, esp. 
pp. 187-194.
2. Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1993.
3. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends? Aristotelian Themes in Early Modern Ethics,” 
in Jon Miller ed., I Reception ofAristotle*s Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2012, p. 196
4. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?,” p. 197.
5. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?,” pp. 197-198.
6. Donald Rutherford, “^e End of Ends.?,” pp. 199,201-202.
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eudaimonism is developed, particularly as it is exemplified in non-human 
animals.”? Further, Rutherford argues, Hobbes “upholdfs] the primacy of 
practical reason as the standpoint from within which deliberation about the 
ends and means of action is conducted."* Rutherford takes the consonance 
between Aristotle and Hobbes on the question of practical reason to show the 
following, that Hobbes, like Aristotle, “takefsj the fundamental practical ques- 
tion for human beings to be the question of how one ought to live, and 
assumefs] that human beings are cognitively and motivationally equipped to 
respond to this question in ways that are likely to increase their prospects for 
happiness."؟ While the claim that humans are cognitively and motivationally 
equipped to address the question of how one ought to live is true of Hobbes, 
the claim that practical reason plays a role in Hobbes’s ethical theory is on 
more tenuous grounds.
Rutherford himself recognizes that Hobbes doesn’t seem to have a view of 
practical reason: "Hobbes official position is that, strictly speaking, there is no 
power of reason.io He argues that Hobbes requires such a notion to gain the 
end of a peaceful state. Despite the fact that "Hobbes leaves no room in his 
philosophy for a substantive notion of practical reason.”“ Rutherford argues, 
he is preoccupied by a practical question: namely., "in what manner must 
human beings live, what rules must govern their lives in order that they may 
enjoy a peaceful and secure social existence?” This practical question, Rutherford 
proposes, requires practical reason to solve. Rutherford writes, “If this is right, 
Hobbes, no less than Aristotle, requires an account of practical reason: an 
account of how reason, as he understands it, can influence and improve prac- 
tice with the result that individuals are able to enjoy a better life than they 
would if guided by passion alone.”
Hobbes, then, must be as concerned as Aristotle was with “How the pas- 
sions (especially fear and desire) can be regulated by reason so that human 
beings are able to enjoy the best life they can in community with other human 
beings.”!2 Here, Rutherford takes the civil state - community with other 
human beings - and the peace of this community to be the highest end for 
Hobbes. In this, I believe he has the priority of the peace and felicity back- 
wards. Indeed, Rutherford has previously recognized the instrumental nature 
of the civil state, ^e good, for humans, is felicity.. The state is what makes 
human felicity possible. That is, for Hobbes, without the civil state, there can 
be no human felicity. The civil state is the means by which the end of human
7. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?," p. 204.
8. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?," p. 204.
9. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?," p. 204.
10. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?," p. 208.
11. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?," p. 208)
12. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?,״ p. 209.
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felicity, understood plurally, is achieved. Once the state is created, the role of 
the state is to support the pro)ect of individual human happiness exclusively 
through maintaining itself.
What regulates the passions, for Hobbes? How can we guarantee peace? 
For Hobbes, the primary mechanism is the civil state. All Hobbes requires for 
human felicity is the civil state. In Hobbes’s state of nature, this requires a 
modicum of instrumental reason and fear to institute. Once the civil state is 
instituted, individuals in the state can seek their felicity in whatever manner 
they choose. They do not need, nor do they have, a faculty of practical reason 
to guide their choices. What they do have is the law. The law, for Hobbes, is 
meant to guide the appetites and aversions of the subjects of the civil state in 
the following way: where they seek something that the law prohibits, they yield 
to the law. How do they do this? Is it through practical reason? No. Rather, it 
is through fear of the sovereign, ^e Hobbesian mechanisms of appetite and 
aversion, along with a knowledge of the law and fear of the sovereign is enough 
for individuals in the Hobbesian civil state to conform, that is, to follow the 
law. For Hobbes, fear of the sovereign and knowledge of the law are sufficient 
to guarantee obedience. To understand why, we need to look back to Hobbes’s 
conception of human motivation.
For Hobbes, individual humans are affective machines, moving alternately 
toward and away from those things we desire or wish to avoid.13 Hobbes calls 
these motions toward appetite and aversion.!* Humans seek naturally., that 
is, physiologically., and as material beings. Hobbes applies a technical term 
for this seeking seemingly specific to humans and animals: coitus. We have 
no special faculty of the will or deliberative reason. Hobbes famously rejects 
these notions؛ Rather, he argues, "deliberation is nothing else but a weigh- 
ing, as it were in scales, the conveniences and inconveniences of the deed we 
are attempting؛ where that is more weighty, doth necessarily according to 
its inclination prevail within us.’io Deliberation, then, is not the deliberative 
reason of Aristotle, but rather, just the process of internal vacillation. What 
each individual seeks will depend on what appetite or aversion tips the scales 
toward action - that is, what is the last appetite before action. As such, Hobbes 
writes, ״^e considerations of appetites and aversions are divers [sic]. For 
seeing living creatures have sometimes appetite and sometimes aversion to 
the same thing, as they think it will be for their good or for their hurt؛ while 
that vicissitude of appetite and aversion remains in them.”٤7 Differences in
13. Ericka ^JCKER, “Spinoza’s Hobbesian Naturalism and its Promise for a Feminist ^eory 
of Power,” Revista Conatus, 7 (2013), p. 17.
14. dornas Hobbes, Leviathan (Edwin Curley ed.), Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1994, 
Chapter 6, pp. 27-28.
15. Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore, Chapter 25, section 13.
16. bornas Hobbes, De Cive, II.xiii.16, 269.
17. bornas Hobbes, De Corpore, Chapter 25, section 13.
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experience also shape what individuals seek. Hobbes describes how this works 
in human development:
Little infants, at the beginning and as soon as they are born, have appetite to very 
few things, and also they avoid very few, by reason of their want of experience 
and memory*, and therefore they have not so great a variety of animal motion as 
we see in those that are more grown. For it is not possible without such knowledge 
as is derived from sense, that is, without experience and memory, to know what 
will prove pleasant or hurtful...And hence it is, that though they do not know 
what may do them good or harm, yet sometimes they approach and sometimes 
retire from the same thing, as their doubt prompts them. But afterwards, by 
accustoming themselves little by little, they come to know readily what is to be 
pursued and what avoided*, and also, to have ready use of their nerves and other 
organs, in the pursuing and avoiding of good and bad. Wherefore, appetite and 
aversion are the first endeavors of animal motion.؛«
Humans are seeking beings. Sense, experience and memory shape what we 
seek. We gain experience by following our appetites in the world, trough 
this experience, we learn which appetites and which aversions lead to felicity. 
We, further, create representations of the world. Our appetites shape our rep- 
resentations; our representations, in turn, create and transform our appetites.!؟ 
Knowledge of the world and what satisfies our appetites and what does not 
serves to allow US to develop our appetites and aversions. Practical reason does 
not play a role here. Reason does not tell US right from wrong, good from evil. 
Rather, knowledge of cause and effect can transform our appetites and thereby 
affect our behavior. Individual humans seek what they believe to increase their 
felicity. However, they do so not based on a faculty of practical reason, will, 
or other such mental tools. Instead, they are seeking beings whose seeking is 
shaped by their experience, appetites and aversions.
We may worry that this approach to human felicity is rather haphazard 
- how can one expect to gain felicity by merely following our desires? Hobbes 
does not think this is how we ought to seek felicity., but rather, how we do seek 
our individual good. We are often wrong. Individuals, he proposes, can indeed 
improve their chances of felicity through understanding the natural world and 
the workings of cause and effect.
Rutherford recognizes the role of sapientia, knowledge of causes and effects 
which Hobbes calls “philosophyO but argues that this does not solve the 
practical question of how we ought to live. He further argues that by intro- 
ducing this notion of knowledge of cause and effects as the way to human
18. Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore, Chapter 25, section 12.
19. bornas Hobbes, De Corpore, Chapter 25, section 9*, Susan James, Passion and Action 
the Emotions in Seventeenth-century Philosophy, Oxford - New York NY, Clarendon Press؛ 
Oxford University Press, 1997.
20. Uromas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 5, section 21؛ De Corpore, Chapters 1.1 and 25.1.
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wellbeing, Hobbes has divided the conative and the cognitive - reason and 
appetite.2! However, if we think of cognition as representations of cause and 
effect, as Hobbes does, it would seem that there is no metaphysical distinction. 
We seek, we learn, and we know as part of the same motions that characterize 
all human action. However, by equating cognition with reason, Rutherford 
has misconceived Hobbes’s point. Yes, we are condemned to seek what we 
desire, but knowledge of the world and ourselves as part of it can shape our 
desires. Our knowledge of cause and effect is, and indeed is the only, way we 
can gain *better’ desires, and thus the only answer that Hobbes has for indi- 
viduals seeking to answer the practical question: how ought I live? Humans 
seeking felicity have only the helps of experience and knowledge of cause and 
effect, which is precisely what makes Hobbes an early modern natural phi- 
losopher writing about ethics.
Knowledge, however, and philosophy are hardly the sorts of pursuits one 
can suggest to a multitude of conative individuals, each seeking felicity 
through following their appetites. Should one seek such philosophical pursuits, 
the conative multitude can indeed be an obstacle. To answer Hobbes’s more 
pressing practical question, that is, how can individuals achieve felicity, he 
focuses on organizing the multitude of desiring machines into a state of peace. 
The state, for Hobbes, is a kind of desire manipulating machine. As I will 
propose below, the Hobbesian state does not seek to control all human desires 
or even many - to do so would be imprudent, given the diversity of human 
desires and the difficulty of promulgating a large set of laws.
Hobbes does not seek the wellbeing of all beyond the institution and main- 
tenance of the state. The state is the solution to the problem of feücity.22 
Whether or not individual humans actually are happy, whether they seek the 
best for themselves or just follow their appetites is no matter for Hobbes’s 
consideration. The state gives them the conditions for achieving happiness, 
sought through experience, appetite, aversion and knowledge of cause and 
effect. This knowledge, for Hobbes, can improve individual chances for hap- 
piness; however knowledge or sapientia is not practical reason. While this 
might seem strange as an ethical position now, it certainly makes sense when 
we think of Hobbes as a seventeenth century natural philosopher who is try- 
ing to understand human behavior. In this, he is much like those philosopher 
who seek human felicity through a better knowledge of ourselves as natural 
beings, namely, Spinoza. When we know more about ourselves as natural 
beings, as part of the network of cause and effect, we can achieve what we seek 
more reliably. Finding out that what we seek might be, for example, unhealthy, 
is a matter both of experience and knowledge. Appetite and aversion are our
21. Donald Rutherford, “The End of Ends.?," p. 208.
22. Fiammetta Palladini, “Pufendorf disciple of Hobbes: The nature of man and the state 
of nature: The doctrine of socialitas," History ofEuropean Ideas, 34 (2008), pp. 2660־.
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motivations. They can be altered through experience, knowledge, and through 
external manipulation by the state. Reason, in the sense of practical moral 
reason, plays no part here. Knowledge of natural causes, and affective manip- 
ulation are, for Hobbes, the only way to regulate the passions.
Rutherford is right to include Hobbes in the Aristotelian tradition where 
human felicity is the end of morality and politics. Hobbes reconfigures ‘felic- 
ity’ as psychological and as the only end of human action. Further, he is rec- 
ognizing it as plural - that is, there may be a different notion of (felicity) for 
each human being. However, Hobbes does not think the key to achieving 
felicity is deliberative reason, as Rutherford suggests. Rather, Hobbes believes 
the precondition to such flourishing is a state of (peace’ ensured only by a civil 
state of the kind Hobbes proposes in his political works.
Part 2؛ Felicity and the State
If Rutherford is right, and practical reason and the end of human happiness 
are both required for characterizing a figure as a eudaimonist, then, given his 
rejection of rational deliberation as the means to the end of happiness, Hobbes 
is no eudaimonist. However, his proposal that in recognizing human diversity 
and still seeking an ethico-political framework that could accommodate the 
end of felicity, Flobbes seems to be doing precisely what Rutherford proposes 
his is doing: trying to keep an Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia while recog- 
nizing the irreducible diversity of human felicity. For Hobbes, there is no one 
thing that can make everyone happy. Yet, there is one thing that will allow for 
human happiness, diversely conceived, that is the civil state.
In considering how Hobbes’s acceptance of (1) we may worry that his ‘solu- 
tion’ to the problem of human happiness - the civil state - strikes most read- 
ers as a genuine impediment to the same. In fact, for most readers of Hobbes, 
the Hobbesian civil state seems a mechanism for insuring fear, and rendering 
any happiness and diversity null. I Hobbesian state seems an unlikely solu- 
tion to the problem of human flourishing. In the next section, I will take up 
this objection and propose that, while Hobbes does not respect the ideal of 
‘liberty’, he does fashion his civil state to allow for felicity, indeed, he argues 
without a civil state no such felicity is possible.
Felicity without Liberty?
Does Hobbes’ political framework allow for diversity and happiness؟ On 
most interpretations of the civil state of Hobbes’s Leviathan, it would not 
appear so. For many readers it appears to be a totalitarian absolutist state. 
As such, it seems there is little room for human freedom, and thus for 
humans to seek their own ends. However, Hobbes seeks to divorce the notion
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of liberty from the notion of felicity and the effective power to achieve it.23 
We can only achieve felicity, for Hobbes, by entering into the civil state where 
we yield our liberty to a S0vereign.24 For Hobbes, felicity requires giving up 
hberty.25
As Hobbes’s contract and civil state are well known, I will briefly set out 
its features. To exit the civil state, and to end the war of each against each, 
humans must contract among themselves to give up their natural right to all, 
and give over all their will and power to a third party - a sovereign, thus 
instituting the civil state.26 This sovereign should have absolute power, to allow 
the ability to secure the commonwealth against internal and external enemies. 
This power includes making, enforcing, and judging the law, as well as opinion 
and reügion.27 An absolute political state of this kind is required for achieving 
or having hope of achieving human felicity.
Hobbes’s state is certainly absolute, but is it totalitarian? Does it seek to 
control its citizen-subjects, and if so, how much? Richard Flathman has 
argued, persuasively, that Hobbes’s state is a ‘thin’ state. Hobbes famously 
wrote, that where the law is silent, men are free.28 According to Flathman, 
Hobbes’s believes the law ought to be mostly silent. On Flathman’s interpreta- 
tion of Hobbes, prudence, and a good knowledge of human passions will guide 
any sovereign to the conclusion that fewer laws are better.29 Fewer laws allow 
the subjects of the civil state maximal opportunity to pursue their own ends, 
their own felicity. Since Hobbes has recognized the diversity of human ends, 
Flathman argues, his state is designed such that the sovereign allows for this 
diversity of felicity through creating only those laws that preserve the state. 
Extraneous or numerous laws inevitably invade the space of silence where the 
subjects are free to pursue their own ends.
Fewer laws are also makes it more likely that individuals will know what 
the laws are. Indeed, Hobbes was very concerned to make sure that the laws 
were known. He goes so far as to propose public educational meetings to let 
the people know the law To know the law, for Hobbes, is to know when one 
must adjust one’s will. Fewer laws also make it more likely that the laws will 
be both known and remember. Hobbes writes, “It is against the charge of those 
who command and have the authority of making laws that there should be 
more laws than necessarily serve for good of the magistrate and his subjects.
23. Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, Cambridge, UK - New York NY, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
24. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 17, sections 113־, pp. 74-78.
25. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13, sections 8-13, pp. 76-78.
26. dornas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13, pp. 74-78.
27. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 18, section 16, p. 115.
28. TCiomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 21, section 18, 143؛ De Cive, Chapter 13.
29. Richard E. Flathman, lomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened 
Politics, London, Sage Publications, 1993, p. 112
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For since men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do, by 
natural reason rather than any knowledge of the laws, where there are more 
laws than can easily be remembered, and whereby such things are forbidden 
as reason of Itself prohibits not of necessity, they must through Ignorance, 
without the least evil intention, fall within the compass of the law, as gins laid 
to entrap their harmless 11berty.’’3٥ I take this passage to show that, for Hobbes, 
when there are more laws than can be easily remembered, humans tend to use 
their natural reason, which leads to their own ends. Without knowing whether 
the law IS silent on this point, they can unintentionally break the law, thus 
‘falling within the compass of the law؛ and undermining the safety of the state. 
This passage also sheds light on Hobbes’s view of‘natural reason؛ Rather than 
help follow the law, natural reason feeds potentially seditious debate which 
only knowledge of the law can quell. The laws must be few, easily remembered 
and based on a knowledge of human appetites and passions, if the state should 
remain secure.
On Flathman’s interpretation, Hobbes IS a thin state theorist because he 
recognized both the diversity of human notions of felicity. Flathman argues 
that Hobbes, in the Leviathan) IS “concerned with the conditions of felicity.’’^ 
Flathman continues, “The primary objective of his moral thinking IS to pro- 
mote and protect each personas pursuit of her own felicity as she herself sees 
It.”32 Hobbes understands the diversity of human passions. Because of this, 
Hobbes seeks a strong and absolute state, but one which has the minimum 
number of laws. Each law, on Hobbes’s view, forces the will of individual 
subjects. Human appetites are diverse, but when the sovereign speaks, that IS, 
when there IS a law allowing or prohibiting some action, the will of the subjects 
must conform to the sovereign’s will. Each individual seeks his or her own 
felicity through following his or her appetites. Fewer laws allow individuals 
more space or freedom to seek their own ends.
We may wonder how the sovereign chooses the few laws that allow both a 
diversity of felicity seeking and secure the state. For this, Hobbes writes, the 
sovereign must understand human passions and appet1tes.33 ^e knowledge 
of the causes of human appetites IS the kind of wisdom, or sap1enttay required 
for an effective sovereign.^
For Hobbes, human felicity amounts to being able to follow one’s appetites. 
Without laws, in the state of nature, no individual can successfully seek his or
30 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, Chapter 13, Richard E Flathman, Thomas Hobbes 
Skepticism, p 118
31 Richard E Flathman, lomas Hobbes Skepticism, p 112
32 Richard E Flathman, hmas Hobbes Skepticism, p 8
33 Richard E Flathman, hmas Hobbes Skepticism, p 112, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 
Introduction, pp 3 5
34 Richard E Flathman, lomas Hobbes Skepticism, pp 84, 112
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her own ends. The equality and diversity of human ends prevents this. Too 
many laws make it more difficulty to seek one’s individual good, since one 
would be required to follow the will of the sovereign rather than one’s own 
will or appetite. As such, just those few laws required to secure the state are 
necessary to allow the condition of the possibility of human felicity and to 
allow the diversity of human appetites that is required for achieving felicity, 
^us, Hobbes’s state is absolute, but not totalitarian. The laws should be few, 
well known and limited to just those required to allow humans to seek their 
diverse conceptions of the good.
The end of the state, for Hobbes, is to provide the condition for human 
flourishing: peace. Peace is only required if we care about seeking our own 
ends, that is, seeking felicity each in our own way. So, for Hobbes, the state is 
the prerequisite to human flourishing, however one conceives one’s own flour- 
ishing. Conflicts between the law and one’s own end of flourishing should be 
minimal, since the laws in a Hobbesian state should be few.
Diversity as a Revolution in Ethics
A eudaimonist in the Aristotelian tradition would, no doubt, reject the idea 
of plural ‘good’ as part of the tradition. Such a theorist might well character- 
ize the idea of a plural good as subjectivist or relativist - two terms that have 
been used to describe Hobbes’s moral philosophy. In placing Hobbes within 
this tradition, Rutherford rejects these latter labels, arguing that Hobbes is 
best understood in context as revising this theory to make room for the real- 
ity of diversity.
For Hobbes, writing in the midst of the wars of religion and the English 
Civil war, the idea of one unifying good that can draw on human benevolence 
to yield a stable political order was no longer a possibility. Such a fiction could 
no longer be sustained in the midst of violent disagreement. Recognizing that 
each seeks a different good, Hobbes takes human diversity as basic. His inno- 
vation is his attempt to show how, given such diversity, peace and flourishing 
can be achieved. Rutherford allows US to see Hobbes’s political achievements 
in a clearer light. Hobbes, he shows US, offers US a way to achieve the good - 
whatever that might mean to individual humans - through political order, 
^is political order, then, becomes the necessary condition for the possibility 
of any kind of flourishing, civil state, sovereign and all, are necessary for 
peace, without which no flourishing is possible.
Reframing Hobbes in this way achieves two things: 1. It puts him squarely 
in the liberal tradition, where diversity of human ends is assumed, and 2. It 
shows that his theory of absolute sovereignty aims not at crushing humans 
into obedient slaves؛ rather, it aims to allow them the possibility of flourishing.
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in whatever way they seek. Hobbes is no liberal.** However, for contemporary 
liberal theorists, liberalism at its essence recognizes the idea that given human 
diversity., any unified notion of the good is untenable.** Hobbes, thus, has an 
important role in this tradition as the first philosopher in the early modern 
to argue that the good is plural.*?
Conclusion
Hobbes took up eudaimonism, as Rutherford argues, but only the in more 
limited way suggested in 1) above, in order to transform it. Pace Rutherford, 
practical reason in Hobbes does not play the role it does in Aristotle. For 
Hobbes, appetites do the work of yielding increased happiness, ^e political 
state does indeed have a role to play in shaping the affects of those in the 
multitude؛ however, Hobbes does not seem to think it should do so on every 
matter, recognizing the importance and irreducibility of human diversity in 
desire and appetite, ^is recognition of diversity is the revolutionary spin 




Hobbes’s views in ethics are sometimes seen to be a skeptical solution to a 
16th Century problem about both ethics and epistemology. Far from a skeptical 
solution, I will argue that Hobbes provided a new conceptual landscape for 
ethics. After Hobbes, one could no longer presume inequality, or assume natu- 
ral sociability, among human beings - one had to argue for them. In this paper, 
I propose understanding Hobbes’ ethical theory in its context, as a system that 
shaped the subsequent history of ethics as a response to Hobbes.
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SOMMAIRE
La morale de Hobbes est parfois vue comme une solution sceptique à un pro- 
blême soulevé par le XVIe siècle concernant la morale et lepistémologie. Loin 
d’une solution sceptique, je montrerai que Hobbes offre un nouveau cadre 
conceptuel pour la morale. Après Hobbes, il était devenu impossible de suppo- 
ser simplement 1’inégalité naturelle entre les êtres humains, ou la sociabilité 
naturelle entre eux: il fallait les prouver. Dans cet article, je propose de consi- 
dérer la morale de Hobbes dans son contexte historique, à savoir comme un 
système qui a fait des théories morales subséquentes des réponses à Hobbes.
